Understanding the Scope of Inherent Powers of Adjudicating Authority in Insolvency Cases

INTRODUCTION

The National Company Law Tribunal [“NCLT”] and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal [“NCLAT”] [collectively, the “Adjudicating Authority”] were established under the Companies Act, 2013.As quasi-judicial bodies, they are empowered by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 [“IBC”] to resolve disputes related to reorganization and insolvency resolution for corporate entities, partnership firms, and individuals. Their main goal is to provide a quick resolution process that aims to maximize asset value, promote entrepreneurship, facilitate access to credit, and protect the interests of all stakeholders.

Analogous to the inherent powers conferred upon civil courts under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [“CPC”],[1] the Adjudicating Authority is vested with inherent powers under Rule 11 of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016[2] [“NCLT Rules”] and Rule 11 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2016[3] [“NCLAT Rules”]. The provision reads as follows:

“11.Inherent Powers.- Nothing in these rules shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Tribunal/Appellate Tribunal to make such orders as may be necessary for meeting the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Tribunal/Appellate Tribunal.”

The inherent powers conferred under Rule 11 of the NCLT/NCLAT Rules[4] empower the Adjudicating Authority to pass such orders as may be necessary to secure the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of law. The pertinent question, however, is the scope and limits of this jurisdiction, specifically, when the Adjudicating Authority may invoke its inherent powers under Rule 11 of the NCLT/NCLAT Rules,[5] and in what circumstances such intervention is justified.

The author, through this article, seeks to study and analyze judicial precedents to discern the rationale adopted by the NCLT, NCLAT, and the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in determining the scope and exercise of inherent powers under Rule 11 of the NCLT/NCLAT Rules.[6] The author shall also analyze the general principles of law laid down by the Hon’ble Court while exercising its inherent powers under Section 151 of the CPC.[7]

GENERAL PRINCIPLES ON INHERENT POWERS EXERCISED BY CIVIL COURTS UNDER CPC

CPC is essentially a procedural law that establishes the mechanism to be followed by civil courts when adjudicating disputes between parties. However, there may be situations where neither the CPC nor its related rules or regulations provides specific guidance. To handle such cases, inherent powers are preserved under Section 151 of the CPC,[8] allowing courts to act in the interest of justice or to prevent abuse of process. Section 151 of the CPC[9] states as follows:

“151. Saving of inherent powers of Court.—Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.”

A straightforward reading of Section 151 of the CPC[10] shows that it functions as a saving clause, safeguarding the inherent powers of civil courts to issue appropriate orders to attain justice. Meanwhile, judicial precedents have consistently highlighted that such inherent powers should be exercised carefully and only in exceptional situations.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Padam Sen v. State of U.P.,[11] had observed the following:

“8….The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature. It is also well recognized that the inherent power is not to be exercised in a manner which will be contrary to or different from the procedure expressly provided in the Code.”

Thereafter, the observations made in the case of Padam Sen[12] were followed in the case of Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal,[13] wherein it was stated that:

“21….These observations clearly mean that the inherent powers are not in any way controlled by the provisions of the Code as has been specifically stated in Section 151 itself. But those powers are not to be exercised when their exercise may be in conflict with what had been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the legislature. This restriction, for practical purposes, on the exercise of those powers is not because those powers are controlled by the provisions of the Code but because it should be presumed that the procedure specifically provided by the legislature for orders in certain circumstances is dictated by the interests of justice.

42. The Code of Civil Procedure is undoubtedly not exhaustive : it does not lay down rules for guidance in respect of all situations nor does it seek to provide rules for decision of all conceivable cases which may arise. The civil courts are authorised to pass such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of court, but where an express provision is made to meet a particular situation the Code must be observed, and departure therefrom is not permissible. As observed in LR 62 IA 80 (Maqbul Ahmed v. Onkar Pratab) “It is impossible to hold that in a matter which is governed by an Act, which in some limited respects gives the court a statutory discretion, there can be implied in court, outside the limits of the Act a general discretion to dispense with the provisions of the Act”. Inherent jurisdiction of the court to make orders ex debito justitiae is undoubtedly affirmed by Section 151 of the Code, but that jurisdiction cannot be exercised so as to nullify the provisions of the Code. Where the Code deals expressly with a particular matter, the provision should normally be regarded as exhaustive.”

In the case of Ram Chand and Sons Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. v. Kanhayalal Bhargava,[14] the Hon’ble Supreme Court had stated the following:

“Having regard to the said decisions, the scope of the inherent power of a court under section 151 of the Code may be defined thus: The inherent power of a court is in addition to and complementary to the powers expressly conferred under the Code. But that power will not be exercised if its exercise is inconsistent with, or comes into conflict with, any of the powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred by the other provisions of the Code. If there are express provisions exhaustively covering a particular topic, they give rise to a necessary implication that no power shall be exercised in respect of the said topic otherwise than in the manner prescribed by the said provisions. Whatever limitations are imposed by construction on the provisions of section 151 of the Code, they do not control the undoubted power of the court conferred under section 151 of the Code to make a suitable order to prevent the abuse of the process of the court.”

Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in My Palace Mutually Aided Co-operative Society v. B. Mahesh & Ors., delivered a significant ruling in which it held that:

“26. Section 151 of the CPC for Civil Courts to invoke their inherent jurisdiction and utilize the same to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process. Although such a provision is worded broadly, this Court has tempered the provision to limit its ambit to only those circumstances where certain procedural gaps exist, to ensure that substantive justice is not obliterated by hyper technicalities.

28. Section 151 of the CPC can only be applicable if there is no alternate remedy available in accordance with the existing provisions of law. Such inherent power cannot override statutory prohibitions or create remedies which are not contemplated under the Code.  Section 151 cannot be invoked as an alternative to filing fresh suits, appeals, revisions, or reviews. A party cannot find solace in Section 151 to allege and rectify historic wrongs and bypass procedural safeguards inbuilt in the CPC.”

The jurisprudence developed through a series of judicial pronouncements indicates that the exercise of inherent powers is permissible only where it is necessary to secure the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court, subject to the limitation that such exercise must not contravene any express provision of law. In the context of civil courts, it has further been emphasized that the invocation of inherent powers must be strictly circumscribed and confined to situations where their exercise is indispensable for the attainment of justice or the prevention of procedural abuse.

JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS ON THE INHERENT POWERS OF THE ADJUDICATING AUTHORITY UNDER RULE 11 OF THE NCLT/NCLAT RULES

A catena of judgments and rulings has been pronounced by the Adjudicating Authority and the Hon’ble Supreme Court under Rule 11 of the NCLT/NCLAT Rules[15] over time. By examining these judicial precedents, the author seeks to analyze the circumstances in which the Adjudicating Authority has been called upon to exercise, or has suo motu exercised, its inherent powers to adjudicate disputes.

In Agarwal Coal Corporation Private Limited v. Sun Paper Mill Limited and Another,[16] the appellant sought the exercise of the Adjudicating Authority’s inherent powers for the purpose of recalling a judgment, alleging fraud on the part of the respondent as the basis for such relief. The Adjudicating Authority, however, held that it does not possess any inherent power of review/recall in the absence of an express statutory provision. It further clarified that Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules,[17] is merely procedural in nature and does not confer any substantive power upon the Tribunal. Consequently, the appropriate remedy in such circumstances would be to prefer an appeal before the appellate forum. The ratio passed in the case of Agarwal Coal Corporation[18] was subsequently also followed by the coordinate bench in the case of Rajendra Mulchand Varma & Ors. v. K.L.J Resources Ltd. & Anr.[19].

However, the above-mentioned position of law was subsequently overturned and declared invalid by a five-member bench in the case of Union Bank of India v. Dinkar T. Venkatasubramanian[20]. In this case, the Adjudicating Authority, while referring to Section 424(2) of the Companies Act, 2013,[21] stated that the Adjudicating Authority has been vested with similar powers as those of the civil courts under the CPC and that Rule 11 of the NCLT/NCLAT Rules[22] is akin to Section 151 of the CPC.[23] The Adjudicating Authority further while referring to the cases of Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala & Ors.[24] and Manohar Lal Chopra[25] affirmed that while the procedures of courts and tribunals may differ, their functions are essentially similar, and both possess inherent powers not by statutory conferment but as an intrinsic attribute of their duty to administer justice. Thereafter, while relying on the principles laid down in the cases Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal[26] and Kapra Mazdoor Ekta Union v. Birla Cotton Spg. and Wvg. Mills Ltd.,[27] clarified that the Adjudicating Authority cannot rehear a matter merely to correct an apparent error, as this would constitute a review, which they are not empowered to do. However, the Adjudicating Authority may invoke its inherent power under Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016[28] to recall a judgment, but only in cases where a procedural error occurred during the delivery of the original judgment.

In the case of Aircastle (Ireland) Ltd. v. Ashish Chawchharia,[29] an appeal was filed against an impugned order wherein the Adjudicating Authority had recalled its original order to rectify factual errors that had caused prejudice to the Respondent. In the appeal, the appellant contested the impugned order, arguing that it effectively amounted to a review of the earlier decision rather than a mere recall, and therefore exceeded the Adjudicating Authority’s powers. The Hon’ble Adjudicating Authority, in its findings, observed that the power of recall is an inherent power of the Tribunal, unlike the power of review, which it does not possess. Recall may be exercised only in limited situations, such as when a procedural error has occurred, for example, if a necessary party was not served or was absent when an adverse order was passed, or where the order was obtained by fraud. This inherent jurisdiction to recall is specifically recognized under Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016.[30] The Adjudicating Authority further relied on the case of Action Barter Pvt. Ltd. v. Srei Equipment Finance Ltd.[31] and Union Bank of India[32] wherein it was stated that Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules is only declaratory, as the NCLAT inherently possesses the power to issue orders or directions to advance justice or prevent abuse of its process. Even without Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules, as a judicial body resolving parties’ rights and granting relief, the NCLAT has inherent authority to act to meet the ends of justice. Rather, Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules merely affirms this power with the Adjudicating Authority to remove any ambiguity. In the end, the Adjudicating Authority ruled that the impugned order was correctly issued and was passed with the intent to rectify mistakes of fact in the original order.

In Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. v. Sai Wardha Power Generation Ltd.,[33] the appellant sought condonation of a 153-day delay in filing its appeal. Relying on Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules, the appellant argued that the Tribunal could invoke its inherent powers to mitigate hardship, citing sufficient grounds for the delay beyond the period prescribed under Section 61(2) of the IBC[34]. The Adjudicating Authority, however, rejected this contention, holding that Rule 11 cannot be used to extend the limitation beyond the additional 15 days permitted under Section 61(2) of IBC[35], since inherent powers cannot override an express statutory provision.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court also analyzed the exercise of inherent powers of the Adjudicating Authority under certain situations in the case of Greater Noida v. Prabhjit Singh Soni.[36] The appellant had allotted leasehold land to the corporate debtor, JNC Construction Pvt. Ltd., for development purposes. Under the terms of the lease, the corporate debtor was obligated to pay instalments towards the lease premium. Persistent defaults occurred in the payment of these dues, whereupon appellant issued demand-cum-pre-cancellation notices in accordance with the lease conditions. Subsequently, the corporate debtor was admitted into CIRP under IBC. Appellant lodged its claim asserting the status of a financial creditor, premised on the argument that the unpaid lease installments constituted a financial debt. The RP, however, reclassified the appellant as an operational creditor and directed it to refile its claim accordingly. However, appellant did not resubmit its claim under this classification. Meanwhile, the CoC considered and approved the resolution plan, which was later sanctioned by the Adjudicating Authority. The approved plan recorded that the appellant had not filed a claim. Aggrieved, appellant moved interlocutory applications seeking (i) recall of the NCLT’s order approving the resolution plan, and (ii) reclassification of its claim as that of a financial creditor. The NCLT rejected both applications, and the NCLAT upheld this rejection on appeal, observing that appellant had failed to pursue its remedies promptly. These developments led to the matter being carried before the Supreme Court.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court affirmed that any court or tribunal has the inherent power to recall an order to secure ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further stated that neither the IBC nor its regulations bar the exercise of inherent powers. On the contrary, Section 60(5)(c) of the IBC[37] authorizes the Adjudicating Authority to decide questions of law or fact arising in insolvency or liquidation proceedings, while Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules[38] preserves its inherent jurisdiction. The Court clarified that the power of recall is to be exercised only on limited grounds, inter alia, where:

a.                  order is without jurisdiction; or

b.                 party has not been served with notice; or

c.                  order has been received on misrepresentation of facts or playing fraud on the court.

Taking note of the circumstances, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the appellant’s applications for recall and reclassification were maintainable. The Court observed that (i) the appellant had not been informed about the CoC proceedings, (ii) the resolution process up to approval of the plan was conducted ex parte, (iii) there was misrepresentation by the RP in stating that the appellant had not submitted any claim, and (iv) the Adjudicating Authority had committed a manifest error in approving a resolution plan that did not satisfy the requirements of Section 30(2) of the IBC[39] read with Regulation 37 and 38 of the CIRP Regulations.[40] In light of the aforesaid omissions by the Adjudicating Authority, the Hon’ble Supreme Court allowed the appellant’s appeal, recalled the impugned order, and remitted the resolution plan to the CoC for reconsideration and resubmission.

There have been several instances where interlocutory applications have been filed under Rule 11 of the NCLT/NCLAT Rules seeking the settlement of disputes after admission of an insolvency application against the Corporate Debtor. In Lokhandwala Kataria Construction (P) Ltd. v. Nisus Finance & Investment Managers LLP[41], the Adjudicating Authority declined to exercise inherent powers under Rule 11 to permit such a settlement post-admission. Though the Hon’ble Supreme Court stated that the observation made by the Adjudicating Authority was the correct position in law, it invoked its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India,[42] and the Hon’ble Supreme Court approved the settlement to bring the matter to a quietus, noting that all concerned parties were before it.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court also exercised a similar position in the case of Uttara Foods & Feeds (P) Ltd. v. Mona Pharmachem.[43] The Hon’ble Supreme Court gave the following opinion:

“2. ….We are of the view that instead of all such orders coming to the Supreme Court as only the Supreme Court may utilise its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the relevant Rules be amended by the competent authority so as to include such inherent powers. This will obviate unnecessary appeals being filed before this Court in matters where such agreement has been reached.”

Subsequently, on the recommendation of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Act, 2018,[44] Section 12A[45] was introduced, enabling withdrawal of insolvency proceedings post-admission. This provision created a formal mechanism for the corporate debtor’s management and its creditors to arrive at a settlement with the approval of the CoC, thereby avoiding the need for prolonged judicial intervention. Section 12A of IBC[46] provides for the withdrawal of an application admitted under Sections 7, 9, or 10.[47] Such withdrawal can only be permitted with the approval of 90% voting share of the CoC. The provision ensures that insolvency proceedings, once initiated, cannot be unilaterally withdrawn by the applicant or the corporate debtor, but only through a collective decision of the CoC. Subsequently, Regulation 30-A was also inserted into the IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016[48] through the IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) (Fourth Amendment) Regulations, 2018.[49] The said regulation prescribes the procedure for withdrawal of applications admitted under Sections 7, 9, or 10 of the IBC,[50] in line with Section 12A.[51] It allows an applicant to withdraw the case before the constitution of the CoC by applying through the IRP directly to the Adjudicating Authority. Once the CoC is constituted, however, withdrawal can only be made through the RP and requires approval of at least 90% of the CoC’s voting share. The regulation further prescribes the use of Form FA and other procedural requirements to ensure fairness and transparency in the process.

Post the above-mentioned amendments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India,[52] clarified the ambit of the Adjudicating Authority’s inherent powers. It emphasized that Rule 11 of the NCLT /NCLAT Rules, 2016[53] does not confer any new jurisdiction but merely affirms the tribunals’ inherent authority to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of process. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that once a creditor’s petition is admitted under Sections 7 to 9 of the IBC,[54] the proceedings become proceedings in rem, reflecting their collective character and affecting all stakeholders of the corporate debtor. Given this collective nature, any settlement by the corporate debtor typically requires the oversight of the CoC. However, prior to the constitution of the CoC, which must be formed within 30 days of the appointment of the interim resolution professional, there exists a procedural gap. During this period, parties may directly approach the Adjudicating Authority. The Adjudicating Authority, in such instances, may exercise its inherent powers under Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016,[55] to allow or reject applications for withdrawal or settlement. The exercise of this power is contingent upon hearing all concerned parties and a careful evaluation of the relevant facts, thereby balancing the collective interests of creditors with the principles of justice and preventing potential abuse of process. Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016[56] thus serves as a vital safeguard, ensuring that interim relief does not undermine the collective nature of insolvency proceedings.

Thereafter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court further elucidated on the exercise of inherent powers under Rule 11 of the NCLT/NCLAT Rules, 2016[57] in the case of GLAS Trust Company LLC v BYJU Raveendran & Ors.[58] In the impugned judgement, the Adjudicating Authority, while exercising its inherent powers under Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules[59] approved the settlement and allowed the withdrawal of the insolvency proceedings, bypassing the formal procedure outlined in Section 12A of the IBC,[60] which requires a 90% majority approval from the CoC for such withdrawals. The Adjudicating Authority’s decision was based on the premise that the settlement was reached before the CoC's formation and was in the interest of justice. In the appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the appellant challenged the impugned judgement that the Adjudicating Authority exceeded its jurisdiction by invoking inherent powers under Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016[61] and without adhering to the statutory requirements under IBC and relevant regulations. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while affirming the view taken in the case of Swiss Ribbons[62], ruled that recourse to Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules[63] was unwarranted in this case. The Adjudicating Authority cannot use its inherent powers to override statutory procedures, which provide a comprehensive framework for withdrawal of insolvency proceedings. Allowing Adjudicating Authority to bypass this procedure would undermine the carefully designed mechanism under the IBC. The Adjudicating Authority did not provide any justification for deviating from the prescribed process or for urgently approving the settlement. The proper approach would have been to stay the constitution of the CoC and direct the parties to follow the procedure under Section 12A of the IBC[64] and Regulation 30A of the CIRP Regulations,[65] which balances procedural safeguards with the objectives of the Code. Furthermore, once the CIRP is admitted, it becomes a collective proceeding involving all creditors. Even when considering Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules,[66] the tribunal must hear all stakeholders and consider relevant factors.

Recently, the Adjudicating Authority in the case of Kiran Kumar Jain v. Cosmos Co-operative Bank Ltd. & Anr.,[67] addressed the invocation of Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules[68] in the context of a settlement in a personal guarantor insolvency application post-admission. In this case, the Financial Creditor initiated proceedings under Section 95 of the IBC[69] against the personal guarantor, which were admitted by the Hon’ble NCLT under Section 100 of the IBC.[70] While the appeal was reserved for judgment, the parties executed a Settlement Agreement and sought disposal of the appeal and closure of the insolvency process through an application under Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules.[71] The Adjudicating Authority observed that, for withdrawal or settlement in personal guarantor insolvency matters, the relevant procedure post-admission is provided under Rule 11(1)(b) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019[72] [“PGIRP Rules”]. Rule 11(1)(b) mandates that post-admission withdrawal requires approval of 90% of creditors, filed in Form D.[73] Accordingly, in line with the observations in the Byju Raveendran case[74] and the relevant rules, the Adjudicating Authority directed that an appropriate application under Rule 11 of the PGIRP Rules[75] should be filed before the court of first instance, which shall decide whether the settlement/withdrawal is permissible.

CONCLUSION

Judicial precedents clearly indicate that the inherent powers of the Adjudicating Authority under Rule 11 of the NCLT/NCLAT Rules[76] are complementary to statutory provisions and cannot be exercised to override or circumvent the express provisions of the IBC or other applicable laws. Analogous to Section 151 of the CPC,[77] these powers are intended to be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances, primarily to address procedural gaps, instances of fraud, misrepresentation, or other situations that result in manifest injustice. The jurisprudence consistently emphasizes that the exercise of inherent powers must not contravene statutory mandates or the carefully designed procedural framework of the IBC.

In the context of corporate or personal guarantor insolvency proceedings, the Supreme Court in Swiss Ribbons[78], Byju Raveendran[79] and Kiran Kumar[80] clarified that once insolvency proceedings are admitted, they acquire a collective character, affecting all stakeholders of the corporate debtor. The inherent powers under Rule 11 of the NCLT/NCLAT Rules[81] cannot be invoked to circumvent this statutory procedure; doing so would undermine the procedural safeguards and compromise the collective interests of creditors.

Several judicial pronouncements further delineate the proper scope of Rule 11 of the NCLT/NCLAT Rules.[82] While the Adjudicating Authority may exercise its inherent powers to recall orders, correct procedural lapses, or prevent fraud, it cannot rehear cases merely to correct perceived errors, extend statutory timelines beyond the permissible limit, or otherwise contravene express statutory provisions. In essence, Rule 11 of the NCLT/NCLAT Rules[83] affirms the inherent jurisdiction of the Adjudicating Authority to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of process but is not a substitute for compliance with statutory or regulatory mandates.

Overall, the judicial approach establishes a delicate balance regarding Rule 11 of the NCLT/NCLAT Rules[84] which serves as a safeguard to secure justice and prevent abuse while ensuring that the collective nature of insolvency proceedings is respected and the rights of all stakeholders are protected. The jurisprudence consistently reinforces that inherent powers are complementary and supportive, rather than substitutive, of the statutory framework established under the IBC and related rules and regulations.

[1] The Civil Procedure Code 1908, s.151.

[2] The National Company Law Tribunal Rules 2016, r.11.

[3] The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules 2016, r.11.

[4] The National Company Law Tribunal Rules 2016, r.11; The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules 2016, r.11.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Supra Note 4.

[7] Supra Note 1.

[8] Supra Note 1.

[9] Supra Note 1.

[10] Supra Note 1.

[11] Padam Sen v. State of U.P., 1960 SCC OnLine SC 77.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, 1961 SCC OnLine SC 17.

[14] Ram Chand and Sons Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. v. Kanhayalal Bhargava,1966 SCC OnLine SC 215.

[15] Supra Note 4.

[16] I.A. No. 265 of 2020 in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 412 of 2019, Agarwal Coal Corporation P. Ltd. v. Sun Paper Mill Ltd.

[17] Supra Note 2.

[18] Supra Note 16.

[19] I.A. No. 3303 of 2022 in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 359 of 2020, Rajendra Mulchand Varma v. K.L.J. Resources Ltd.

[20] Union Bank of India v. Dinkar T. Venkatasubramanian, (2024) 248 Comp Cas 108

[21] The Companies Act 2013, s. 424 (2).

[22] Supra Note 4.

[23] Supra Note 1.

[24] Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala, 1961 SCC OnLine SC 38

[25] Supra Note 13.

[26] Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal, 1980 Supp SCC 420; The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that even though there was no express provision to set aside the award, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to pass the order, which is an ancillary and incidental power to discharge its functions effectively.

[27] Kapra Mazdoor Ekta Union v. Birla Cotton Spg. and Wvg. Mills Ltd., (2005) 13 SCC 777; The Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that the power of the court or quasi-judicial authority to review its judgment must be conferred by law expressly, whereas procedural review is different, which is inherent in the court or Tribunal.

[28] Supra Note 2.

[29] Aircastle (Ireland) Ltd. v. Ashish Chawchharia, 2024 SCC Online NCLAT 1223.

[30] The similar observations were also passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sri Budhia Swain v. Gopinath Deb & Ors., (1999) 4 SCC 396.

[31] Action Barter Private Limited v. SREI Equipment Finance Limited, 2020 SCC OnLine NCLAT 1137.

[32] Supra Note 20.

[33] Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution v. Sai Wardha Power Generation Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine NCLAT 1085.

[34] The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016; s.61 (2).

[35] Ibid.

[36] Greater Noida v. Prabhjit Singh Soni, (2024) 6 SCC 767

[37] The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016; s.60 (5) (c).

[38] Supra Note 2.

[39] The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016; s.30 (2).

[40] IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations 2016, reg.37 and 38.

[41] Lokhandwala Kataria Construction (P) Ltd. v. Nisus Finance and Investment Managers LLP, (2018) 15 SCC 589.

[42] The Constitution of India 1950, Art.142.

[43] Uttara Foods & Feeds (P) Ltd. v. Mona Pharmachem, (2018) 15 SCC 587.

[44] The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Act 2018, No. 26 of 2018.

[45] The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016, s.12A.

[46] Ibid.

[47] The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016, s.7,9 and 10.

[48] IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations 2016, reg.30-A.

[49] The IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) (Fourth Amendment) Regulations, 2018.

[50] Supra Note 47.

[51] Supra Note 46.

[52] Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17

[53] Supra Note 4.

[54] Supra Note 47.

[55] Supra Note 2.

[56] Supra Note 2.

[57] Supra Note 2.

[58] GLAS Trust Co. LLC v. BYJU Raveendran, (2025) 3 SCC 625.

[59] Supra Note 3.

[60] Supra Note 46.

[61] Supra Note 3.

[62] Supra Note 52.

[63] Supra Note 3.

[64] Supra Note 46.

[65] Supra Note 48.

[66] Supra Note 3.

[67] Kiran Kumar Jain v. Cosmos Coop. Bank Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine NCLAT 1394.

[68] Supra Note 3.

[69] The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016, s.95.

[70] The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016, s.100.

[71] Supra Note 3.

[72] The Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019; r.11 (1) (b).

[73] The Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019; r.11 (2).

[74] Supra Note 58.

[75] The Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019; r.11.

[76] Supra Note 4.

[77] Supra Note 1.

[78] Supra Note 52.

[79] Supra Note 58.

[80] Supra Note 67.

[81] Supra Note 4.

[82] Supra Note 4.

[83] Supra Note 4.

[84] Supra Note 4.